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LIABILITY IN CALIFORNIA FOR THE DROWNING
OF TRESPASSING CHILDREN
By PHILIP N. SCHMIDT
It is now well established in California that there is no liability under
the attractive nuisance doctrine for the death by drowning of a trespassing
child when such drowning occurs in swimming pools, reservoirs, or other
open, natural, artificial, or semi-artificial bodies of water.
The leading case is Peters v. Bowman,' wherein the plaintiff brought
an action to recover damages for the death of his eleven-year-old son who
drowned in a pond of water on a lot owned by the defendant in the City of
San Francisco. Surface water from this lot flowed into a gully. The city,
in the process of street grading, had erected an embankment which pre-
vented the runoff from reaching the gully; the water therefore, during the
rainy season, would back up and form the pond. Children were known to
play upon the pond, and the defendant had at times driven them off. Plain-
tiff, too, had warned his son not to play there. The boy ignored his father's
warnings and constructed a raft of railroad ties, which he launched upon
the pond. He fell off and was drowned.
The plaintiff sought to bring the case within the attractive nuisance
doctrine as exemplified by the "turntable cases" (where trespassing chil-
dren were injured while playing on unsecured railway turntables), recog-
nized at this time in California.2 This doctrine as it has developed today
contains five necessary elements. The contrivance must be: (1) artificial,
(2) uncommon, (3) dangerous, (4) capable of being rendered safe without
destroying its usefulness, and (5) of such a nature as to virtually constitute
a trap into which children would be led on account of their ignorance and
inexperience.3 The court in the Peters case refused to extend this doctrine,
reasoning that such ponds create no more attraction to children than nat-
ural streams or pools, cannot be rendered inaccessible by ordinary means
(asserting that a fence is not the answer), and that the owner of a thing
dangerous and attractive to children is not because of this liable for injury
to them, for it is the duty of parents to warn their children of common dan-
gers. In distinguishing the principal case from a turntable situation, Justice
Beatty (upon a petition for a rehearing) said:
"But, with respect to dangers specially created by act of the owner, novel
in character, attractive and dangerous to children, easily guarded and ren-
dered safe, the rule is, as it ought to be, different; and such is the rule of
the turntable cases, the lumber pile cases, and others of similar character."'4
This leads to the problem of ascertaining which fact-type situations
will or will not give rise to liability for the drowning of a trespassing child.
1 115 Cal. 345, 47 Pac. 113 (1896).
2 Barret v. Southern Pacific Co., 91 Cal. 296, 27 Pac. 666 (1891).
3 Morse v. Douglas, 107 Cal. App. 196, 201, 290 Pac. 465, 467 (1930).
4 115 Cal. 356 (1896).
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Open Artificial or Semi-Artificial Bodies of Water Created
by Third Parties
There is no liability for the death by drowning of a trespassing child
in-open artificial or semi-artificial bodies of water created by third parties
upon the land of the defendant. This is demonstrated by Peters v. Bow-
man,5 discussed supra, where the City of San Francisco built the embank-
ment that caused the rainwater to fill the defendant's land. This of itself
takes the case out of the attractive nuisance doctrine, for it removes the
element of artificiality. As the court noted,
"Defendant did nothing to create the pond, or to prevent the water from
flowing away; and so far as he is concerned, it may be considered a natural
pond."8
The court then brings this case within the general rule that an owner or
occupant of land is under no duty to keep his premises safe for trespassers,
and that pools obviously are not in the nature of a trap or hidden danger
so as to bring the facts within a recognized exception to the rule of non-duty
toward trespassers.7
Open Artificial or Semi-Artificial Bodies of Water Created
by Defendant Owner or Occupant
There is no liability where a trespassing child is drowned in an open
artificial or semi-artificial body of water created by the defendant owner
or occupant of the land. Defendant in King v. Simons Brick Co." removed
soil and clay from his property for the purpose of making bricks, leaving
a large pit of some four acres, with two acres thereof having an average
depth of 25 feet. He thereafter abandoned excavation on the lot. Water
began to fill the irregular surface until, after five years, the deep portions
were filled with water and the more shallow spots were covered with two
to eighteen inches of water. The surface was muddy, and the depth could
not therefore be ascertained. The pond thus created a constant lure to the
children in the neighborhood who liked to play and wade about its edges.
It was a trap in so far as the deep portions were concerned, but was of itself
open and obvious. Plaintiff's 12-year-old son waded into the pit. After play-
ing about the edges of the water, he suddenly stepped into a deep pocket
and was drowned. The court held that the attractive nuisance doctrine did
not extend to an "unguarded pool of water," and that it is the duty of par-
ents to warn their children of such hazards. It should be noted that the
defendant created the pit by excavation, but that the filling of said pit with
water was due to natural causes.
5 See also Demmer v. City of Eureka, 78 Cal. App. 2d 708, 178 P.2d 472 (1947).
6 115 Cal. at 348, 47 Pac. at 113.
7 See RESTATEmNT, TORTS § 335 (1934).
8 52 Cal. App. 2d 586, 126 P. 2d 627 (1942).
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This leads us to the recent swimming pool cases, where defendants
constructed entirely artificial bodies of water, thereby fulfilling a prime
requisite of the attractive nuisance doctrine--artificiality'
In Lake v. Ferrer,'° plaintiff's two-year-old child, in company with a
four-year-old, wandered onto defendant's residential property from the
rear of plaintiff's property. They were apparently attracted by the shining
upper portions of the swimming pool ladder, which was the only part of
the pool structure visible from the plaintiff's premises. Plaintiff's child fell
in and drowned while playing about the pool. The parents of the deceased
child alleged that they did not know of the pool's existence, since it was con-
cealed from their view. They also claimed that the defendants knew that a
small child lived on the adjoining property, and that such a child would
likely be attracted to the pool, and that the defendants did not even give a
"neighborly warning." The plaintiff contended that a two-year-old child
could not be charged with knowledge of the danger involved in playing
about bodies of water, thus distinguishing Peters v. Bowman and earlier
cases involving older children. Defendant replied that in the absence of
sufficient evidence to invoke the attractive nuisance doctrine, age is of no
matter, because such age would not give rise to liability where none would
otherwise exist. The Court concurred with the defendant's viewpoint, citing
the Peters case as the leading case wherein the turntable rule was held not
to extend to an open pool of water. Hence age was held to be of no instance.
In Wilford v. Little," where a 4I -year-old trespasser drowned in a
neighbor's swimming pool by falling off the diving board, the court said:
"It is our opinion however, that a swimming pool and diving board is not an
attractive nuisance as that term is generally used."' 2 The court then refers
to the California Annotations to the Restatement of Torts"S in support of
that principle. In affirming judgment for the defendant, the court stated in
effect that neglect of parental care will not change a situation which is not
an attractive nuisance to older children into such a situation merely be-
cause a child of very tender years has no knowledge of the danger.
The Reservoir Cases
There is no liability where a child is drowned upon land generally ac-
cessible to the public whereon there is located a reservoir or similar body of
water. Defendant maintained a public cemetery in San Francisco in an area
surrounded by thoroughfares. The cemetery was no longer used as a burial
ground, but was kept up in the nature of a park with the previous graves
remaining. It was open from 7 a.m. to 5 p.m. and great numbers of children
frequented the area. Rules for expected public behavior were posted at the
entrance. There was an unenclosed reservoir a short distance from the en-
9 See RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 339 (1934).
10 139 Cal. App. 2d 114, 293 P.2d 104 (1956).
1 144 Cal. App. 2d 477, 301 P.2d 282 (1956).
1Id. at .........,301 P.2d at 283.
13 See CALiF. ANNOT. TO RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 339(b) (1940).
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trance, constructed of concrete extending about 12 inches above an earth
embankment which sloped downward from the edge of the concrete. Chil-
dren often played about the reservoir. One afternoon the eight-year-old son
of the plaintiff fell in the water and was drowned.
Thus, in Polk v. Laurel Hill Cemetery Assn., 4 the plaintiff alleged neg-
ligence on the part of defendant for not fencing the reservoir, and for fail-
ing to post a warning sign, while having full awareness of the fact that chil-
dren played there. The court excused defendant from liability under the
rule of duty towards users of thoroughfares for hazardous excavations
abutting the highway since the reservoir was sufficiently clear of the road
and of an open nature. On the latter basis the trap approach was also ex-
cluded.
The status of the child was established as being that of an invitee for
the purpose of visiting a final resting place of the dead, and it was found
that when the child romped and played he went beyond the purpose for
which he had a privilege. Thus the only possibility for recovery was under
the turntable doctrine. In answer to this contention the court said:
"A pond of water, it may be conceded, is always attractive to youngsters,
but the dangers connected with and inherent in a lake or pond of water,
natural or artificial, are obvious to everybody-even to a child old enough
to be permitted by its parents to go about and play unattended upon the
streets or public parks. It would not conform to the dictates of common
reason to say that a child of the age of eight years old, or even much
younger, does not know and fully realize that a fall into a pond of water
or a deep reservoir would result in injury to him, if not in his death."' 5
Attraction to Water by an Object on or Near the Water
The owner or occupant of land is not liable for the drowning of a tres-
passing child when the infant is attracted thereto by an object floating on
the water or attached near the water. In Reardon v. Spring Valley Water
Co.'6 the defendant was proprietor of an open reservoir in a residential
neighborhood. A fence surrounded the reservoir but it was in need of repair,
having many holes and gaps through which children could easily pass. A
small boat floated alongside a little landing platform. Plaintiff's five-year-
o!d son climbed into the boat, floated out onto the water, fell from the boat,
and was drowned. The court asserted that the rule of the turntable cases
does not apply to unguarded bodies of water and then asked the question:
"Can it be that if he falls from a rowboat left upon the water by the owner
of the property and is drowned a different legal principle is involved? ' '17
The court answered by citing Peters v. Bowman and other cases where the
1437 Cal.App. 624, 174 Pac. 414 (1918). See also Betts v. San Francisco, 108 Cal. App. 2d
701, 239 P.2d 456 (1952).
1537 Cal. App. at 634, 174 Pac. at 418.
16 68 Cal. App. 13, 228 Pac. 406 (1924). See also Ward v. Oakley Co., 125 Cal. App. 2d
840, 271 P.2d 536 (1954).
17 68 Cal. App. at 18, 228 Pac. at 408.
May, 1957] COMMENTS
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
child himself had constructed the object from which he fell while paddling
about, and stated that there was no difference in the two situations. Judg-
ment for the defendant was affirmed.
The Storm Drain Cases
Beeson v. City of Los Angeles 18 was the first of the storm drain cases.
The city maintained an open storm drain about twenty feet deep and
twenty feet wide. At a point in the drain there was a pit about seven feet
deep and seven feet square, apparently caused by water erosion during the
stormy season. Miscellaneous debris blocked the free flow of water, filling
the hole and leaving about a foot of muddy water in the storm drain during
the periods when there was no run-off from the city streets. Children were
known to play in the storm drains of the city. Plaintiff's ten-year-old son
was playing and wading in the drain when he fell into the pit and was
drowned. Plaintiff sought to bring the accident within the attractive nui-
sance concept alleging that the city was negligent in not filling the hole
which constituted a trap.
Quoting from Morse v. Douglas,9 the court said that for a contrivance
to be within the attractive nuisance approach it,
'"must be artificial, uncommon, as well as dangerous, and capable of being
rendered safe with ease without destroying its usefulness, and of such a
nature as to virtually constitute a trap into which children would be led on
account of their ignorance and inexperience. '20
Applying the facts to the requirements, the court said that the water around
and in the hole, and the hole itself, were not created by the city but by the
forces of nature. All the other elements of attractive nuisance were appar-
ently present-a trap in an otherwise regulation storm drain; the city
could have easily filled same; the hole was dangerous and perhaps uncom-
mon within a storm drain; the storm drain was not guarded; and children
were known to play therein. Thus on the precise point that the hole itself
was a result of natural causes (despite the fact that the storm drain which
made the hole possible was an artificial thing) the plaintiff was denied re-
covery. The importance of the element of artificiality will be brought more
sharply into focus in the siphon case to be discussed under the next sub-
section of this article.
In Melendez v. City of Los Angeles,2  another storm drain case with
very similar fact circumstances, the court reached the same conclusion as
regards natural causes creating the hole, but added the reasoning that the
common knowledge of a ten-year-old as to the dangers inherent in bodies of
water includes the fact that water running over a surface creates the prob-
ability that erosion will occur with the consequence of an uneven bottom.
18 115 Cal. App. 122, 300 Pac. 993 (1931).
19 107 Cal. App. 196, 290 Pac. 465 (1930).
20 115 Cal. App. at 127, 300 Pac. at 996.
21 8 Cal. 2d 741, 68 P.2d 971 (1937).
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The Siphon Case
There may be liability where the water in which the trespassing child
drowns attracts him thereto, but his drowning is directly caused by a man-
made hidden trap. There is one case of this type in California. It has been
termed the "siphon case." Sanchez v. East Contra Costa Irrigation Co.,
appears on immediate perusal to be very similar to the storm drain cases in
that the actual drowning was the direct result of a concealed trap beneath
the water. In the storm drain cases the trap was a pit or hole; in the present
case it was a siphon connecting an irrigation canal to a creek. There is one
important difference-the siphon was man-made.
The defendant owned canals and ditches which flowed past roads and
other obstructions. The Sanchez tragedy occurred at a spot where it was
necessary to pass the canal water across a creek. A siphon was constructed
to run from the bottom of the canal downward under the creek bed and up
again on the other side. The opening into the siphon was about four feet in
diameter and had no guard (such as a grate) covering it, nor was any warn-
ing sign posted in the vicinity. Plaintiff was an employee of the canal com-
pany who lived in company housing near the siphon with other families in
the employ of defendant. Plaintiff's five-year-old son was playing with
other children near the canal, as was their custom. The boy attempted to
wet his handkerchief in the canal, which contained about three feet of
muddy water, and in so doing slipped into the canal and then into the si-
phon which could be seen due to the discolored water. The body was re-
covered from about fifteen feet within the siphon.
It was admitted by the plaintiff that the defendant had no duty to
guard the canal against trespassing children. However, the court decided
that since the defendant knew children played about the canal, and knew
that they might easily fall in, there was a duty to guard against this trap,
which was artificial in its nature. The court said that the canal was the bait
and the siphon the trap.
Luring Contrivance Attracts the Child to Water Which Is
a Trap
The landowner may be liable where the water in which the child drowns
is a trap, and the child is lured thereto by a contrivance particularly attrac-
tive to children of his age. In Faylor v. Great Eastern Quicksilver Mining
Co.' defendant owned mining property enclosed by a barbed wire fence.
There was an entrance gate with signs of "danger" and "no admittance"
conspicuously posted, although children were known to cut across the prop-
erty on their way to and from school, and to play there on Saturdays and
Sundays. Evidence was introduced to show that the miners were warned to
keep their children clear of the mine, and that plaintiff had so told his chil-
22 205 Cal. 515, 271 Pac. 1060 (1928).
2 45 Cal. App. 194, 187 Pac. 101 (1919).
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dren, but that he did not know they played there. When the mine was not
in operation (as over weekends) the small cars used to haul the ore from
within the mine to the outside were left at the mine opening, unattended
and unsecured. In a portion of the mine, called the "old tunnel," there had
been a cave-in; consequently this section was no longer worked. A stope
(an excavation from which ore has been removed) had previously been
driven in the old tunnel to a depth of 500 feet, and covered with boards so
that miners might cross. The stope was filled with water to the 150 foot
level. Johnny Faylor, plaintiff's son, with his brothers, sisters, and another
lad went to the premises on a Sunday to play with the little cars. With the
assistance of a mine company employee (apparently off duty on this day)
they pushed two of the cars into the main tunnel. There was no watchman,
and the cars were not secured. Johnny pushed one into the recesses of the
mine. He returned by the way of the old tunnel, but never reached the en-
trance to the mine. His body was subsequently recovered from the stope.
Plaintiff obtained a verdict that the cars, tunnel, and stope together
were an attractive nuisance under the turntable rule. The appellate court
affirmed and broadly stated the attractive nuisance rule as follows:
"Those who place an attractive but dangerous contrivance in a place fre-
quented by children, and knowing or having reason to believe, that children
will be attracted to it, and subjected to injury thereby, owe the duty of
exercising ordinary care to prevent such injury to them, because such per-
sons are charged with knowledge of the fact that children are likely to be
attracted thereto and are usually unable to foresee, comprehend, and avoid
the danger into which they are thus knowingly allured. '24
This court, like others, quoted Peters v. Bowman to show the elements
necessary to the attractive nuisance idea in relation to the contrivance, i.e.
that the thing must be artificial, uncommon, and in the nature of a trap and
easily rendered safe wihout impairing its usefullness. As to the matters of
attractiveness and the trap, the court likened the push cars and the tunnel
to the bait, saying that the cars and tunnel presented a challenge of adven-
ure to young children, and that the concealed stope was the trap hidden in
the recesses of the old tunnel where the boys could be expected to wander
in their exciting play.
In discussing whether proper care had been taken, whether the children
were old enough to have anticipated the danger, and if decedent was con-
tributorily negligent, the court declared that these were questions for the
jury, and that there was sufficient evidence pro and con to reach the deci-
sion for the plaintiff.
Water Concealed from View Constituting a Trap
There may be liability where the water is concealed from view in a
manner as to constitute a trap. Plaintiff, in Blaylock v. Jensen,25 was a girl
2 4 1d. at 199, 187 Pac. at 103.
2544 Cal. App. 2d 850, 113 P.2d 256 (1941). See also Long v. Standard Oil Co., 92 Cal.
App. 2d 455, 207 P.2d 837 (1949).
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of about thirteen years who brought an action for injuries suffered by being
mired in an oil sump on property in possession of the defendants. Plaintiff
and friends were walking along a highway when they heard plaintiff's dog
barking from the adjoining property. The children went onto the land and
found that the dog could not extricate himself from what the plaintiff de-
scribed as "just black with dirt and I could not tell what it was." Witnesses
testified, "it looked brown" and it was "covered with sand and had black
streaks on it." Plaintiff, intent on rescuing her dog, walked about ten feet
onto the sump, and suddenly became mired, being unable to progress or
retreat. She fell, and then lay on her side for several hours before being res-
cued. With the exception of her head and left arm she was completely sub-
merged.
The court gave judgment for plaintiff, asserting that the decision could
be upheld "under the general rule that a landowner may not construct or
maintain a trap or pitfall into which he knows or has reason to believe that
a trespasser will probably fall."26 Nothing appears in the report as to the
frequency of trespassing on the particular property, but since the land was
but one mile from the town of Nipoma, and near a highway, it was probably
not so remote from population as to make trespassing an infrequent occur-
rence, and therefore, within the above stated general rule. On the issue of
contributory negligence the court decided that the age of the child should be
considered, plus the fact that she had never seen this particular sump or, for
that matter, any oil sump, and that it was not contributory negligence as a
matter of law to attempt to rescue the dog unless the risk in so doing was
"wanton and unreasonable." In passing, the court stated that the liability in
such a case might well extend to injuries suffered by an adult under similar
circumstances. The inference apparently is that while the general rule of
liability to trespassers for hidden traps applies to all trespassers, the pecu-
liar fact situation must be studied, for a child might not be chargeable with
the same degree of knowledge concerning a particular hazard-i.e., what
should be recognizable as a trap to an adult may not be so recognizable to
a child. Thus if children were known to trespass, the standard of care might
be higher. Oil, not water, formed the trap in the present case, but it can be
seen that a pond of water too, might be so covered with scum or weeds as to
be not recognizable for what it is except under close scrutiny.
Water Is in Nature of a Concealed Trap and in Close
Proximity to a Thoroughfare
Malloy v. Iibernia Savings & Loan Society27 was an early California
case that never reached a final decision. Plaintiff's four-year-old son was
drowned in defendant's cesspool, which was ten feet from a public street.
Plaintiff alleged that defendant was negligent in leaving the cesspool un-
guarded after removing a fence and housing from over the pool. Defendant's
26 44 Cal. App. 2d at 852, 113 P.2d at 257.
273 Cal. Unrep. 76, 21 Pac. 525 (1889)
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demurrer was sustained. Plaintiff appealed, contending that great caution is
required of persons having dangerous works or excavations exposed near a
public street. Appellee maintained that since the deceased was a trespasser,
no such duty was owed. The appellate court reversed, holding that the com-
plaint stated a cause of action.1
8
In a later case,2" the court, in referring to the Malloy case, stated that
the complaint would have been sufficient to warrant recovery had it been
an adult rather than a child who had been killed.
Thus we have run the gamut of fact-type situations regarding the lia-
bility of a possessor of land for the death of a trespassing child by drowning.
The matter as presented is well settled. However, there is one problem that
looms continuously larger in the California picture-that of small children
and the modern swimming pool. One need but drive leisurely through almost
any of the California suburbs to see the mushrooming of swimming pools.
Although these pools are still the exception rather than the rule, their num-
ber continues to increase. With this rapid growth of the swimming pool as
an adjunct to the California home there is bound to be a corresponding in-
crease of drowning tragedies, particularly where trespassing children of
very tender years are concerned, who, escaping for a moment the eyes of
their watchful mother, will wander across from adjoining property and fall
into the shining water. This could be prevented. The answer lies in legisla-
tion which perhaps will be an outcome of repeated lawsuits on this precise
subject. It will be noted that both the Lake v. Ferrer and Wilford v. Little
cases occurred in 1956.
True, the courts say that a parent has a duty to guard such little chil-
dren, but with residence on top of residence it is so simple for a child to
quickly dash off while the parent is engaged in some momentary task. The
child might get pricked by a rose bush or fall on some bricks, but it is only
in a very unusual occurrence of this nature that death or serious bodily harm
would result. However, if in that moment when the child strays away, he
falls into a swimming pool, his death is an almost certain result.
In Peters v. Bowman the court noted that a fence around a body of
water will not keep a child out-but the court was speaking in terms of ac-
ive youth of at least the age of five or six years. A fence around the pool or
around the property would certainly be effective to keep out children of such
tender years as must still struggle to mount stairways. A statute requiring
property owners to erect some substantial type of fence or hedge or other
sufficient guard around the pool seems like a logical answer to the problem.
There is a related statute in the California Health and Safety Code,30
the context of which follows:
Every person owning land in fee simple or in possession thereof under lease
or contract of sale who knowingly permits the existence on the premises of
28 There are no further reports on this case.
29 Loftus v. Dehail, 133 Cal. 214, 65 Pac. 379 (1901).
3 0 CALrf. HEALTH AND SAEY CODE § 24400.
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any abandoned mining shaft, pit, well, septic tank, cesspool, or other aban-
doned excavation dangerous to persons legally on premises, or dangerous
to minors under the age of 12 years, who fails to cover or fence securely
any such abandoned excavation and keep it so protected, is guilty of a mis-
demeanor. (Emphasis added.)
This code section was enacted in 1939 and amended in 1949, and apparently
there are no cases as yet in which liability was predicated thereon.3 The
issue was raised in Ward v. Oakley Co.,32 but the "purported" liability
thereunder was barred by the statute of limitations; 33 hence the question as
to whether the failure to observe this act is negligence per se is apparently
still an open question. With the exception of King v. Simons Brick Co., the
cases in this article to which the statute might be applicable on their fact
situations occurred before its enactment. There was no mention of the stat-
ute in the King case.
An enactment of this type constructed particularly to apply to swim-
ming pools would probably have the desired effect of making much less
likely the drownings of the very young children who have no clear under-
standing of the hazards attendant to an unguarded body of water.
The California courts have established their precedent for nonliability
where open, unguarded bodies of water are concerned. It is the duty of the
legislature, therefore, to insure that the swimming pool drownings are not
needlessly multiplied in the future, when a swimming pool will likely join
the two car garage as typical of California homes.
3141 WEST'S AN. CALIF. CoDEs § 24400 (1955).
8 125 Cal. App. 2d 840, 271 P.2d 536 (1954).
3 3 Id. at 851, 271 P.2d at 543.
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